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LETTER FROM MR. FLANIGAN FORMERLY OF THE NEW YORK BAR AND
NOW OF THE DENVER BAR*
Denver, Colo., September 18, 1929.
Dear Mr. Iditor:
suggested by yer Mr. Ghoul of the local barr, I'm
givin yez me impressions of the gineral legal asspects
of the situation in Dinver and vicinity. In the first
place I wish to pay me respecks to "Dicta" that wonderful
magazine idited by Mr. S. Arthur Hinry while in Europethat is to say, "In Absinthe", so to spake. I will say it has
wonderful spirit, trusting ye know which pronoun I am speaking of. Since Mr. Toll-the Bellewither of the Dinver Barr
gave it a new shirt, dicta is a delight to the naked eye and
when he christened it too, this added the final ne plus ultry,
non compos mint juleps sina non quod necessary to reenforce
its paternal ancistry.
Would you please advise me, is the desygn on the cover
the coat of arms bestowed on Hinry Toll by Queen Marie, or
did S. Arthur rob some night and/or knight in the Court of
St. James. Whin I see the changin colors on the civers oim
reminded of the change in seasons. Winter, July and August,
the principal stages of human life, youth, manhood and destrict Judge, and the Eighteenth amindment. Whin at last I
tare me gloatin eyes from the civer and glanct within, say
but I'm simplee amazed at the wisdum displayed and such a
wealth of larnin by authors ye'd niver suspict. Sure, an corpis
juries should be in every libery.
I red in one Dicta with a green civer an articul by Jidge
Dennison, as how a lawyer is a kind of profit and how by

AS

Mr. Flanigan now practices law in Denver under the alias of
*EDITOR'S NoTE:
Mr. George P. Winters.
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carefuly readin the cases of our court of Last Retort he can
prognostibate which leading case will be overruled nixt. Say
but that is one splendid idee and if any mimber of the bahr
has acheeved that degree of proficiency in the realms of
chanct, he has assured hisself a nick in the hall of fame. For
thim philanthropic gintlemen who is anxious to open an institoot of higher larnin for dog breedin and rabbit chasin near
Lakeside would pay well to find out in advanct just what the
deestric atturney and the Jidge will do in the nixt Invistment
and educational cission whin opened.
I have only bin a risident of your fair city for a short
time-that is since Al Smith was not elected president the last
time, but have all ready lamed that "It is a privilege to live
in Colorado where ivery prospect plases and every other man
is vile."
I jined the Dinver Barr Association at the last annuel
meetin--one long-enough to be remimbered. I enjoied the
wittie sallads of the prisident. There were meny spaches that
avenin preceded and followed by the chairman who carefully
explained their jokes fully. I realize it is the Christun dooty
of the chairman to suffocate as many speakers as possible for
the good of the order, but that avenin the Toll seemed unusually heavy. There was one letter red by some brither lawyer who was or was not a mimber, or did or did not want to
become such, it not being clear which. At the end of the first
hour I was of the impression he "wanted in", if several others
were thrown out-havin spicial riference to a couple of guys
who had took the job he didnt want and whom the writer Costigated most siverely. During the last hour of the letter readin
I had a suspicion that the author did not want to come in at
all at all but was double-darin the committee to take him in.
Whereupon the brither was elected unanimously by a decision
of the head table sitting in bunk, it being the opinion of the
laders of the barr that the gintleman had the absolute right
to be elected-as he was alridy a mimber.
Mr. Iditor: I am sorry yez missed the bahr piknic. Say
it was a treet. In the first place it is a privilige to meet on
a plain of social equality wid some of your more fortunit
brithern whose ads appear in the sasity column or under
"crime never pays". Also it is a privilege to git acquainted
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wid some of the 4 & 6 cylinder legal firms that are big enuf
to employ lawyers to do the work. Thin agin, what a wonderful site for a picnic is Mt. Vernon, perched up there in
the sky and leanin against the very ramparts of hiven wid the
poluted waters of Clear Creek runnin below and in the distance nistled among the hills the little city of Golden the
stronghold of receiverships and far to the east over the plains,
Crown Hill and the Tower of Re-Collections, the Flower of
them all.
Unfortunately it rained which stopped the baseball game
between the Binch and Bar and spoiled the aspirations of
some of the mimbers of the bahr to make a few motions which
the binch could not overrule wid safety. Also some of the
boys were desirus of sayin from the side lines what they really
thot of the jidges having the right to openly commint on the
ividents insted of making sour faces as heretofore.
The golf tournament was won by Mr. Sass. At first this
was supposed to be Appul Sass, but it turned out to be Fred
Sass who had the biggest handicap, the poorest memory and
found the most balls.
The dinner was a life saver that cold nite. The judicial
chill bein quite thawed out entirely by hot soup, and the Binch
smiled compassionately on the legal lights they intinded to
snuff out in the mornin. We would recommind from now on
that after a case is tried a recess be taken and a good hot meal
served before the jidges consume the evidence. After dinner
we all adjirned to the ring where everbody was in the best
of spirits in spite of the cold-sure and hot soop is the wonderful stimulentl The bout of the avenin was Bob Smelling
Moore vs. Otto the Terrible and the climax was reached
when Bob threw up his hands and Otto his supper.
An account of the picnic wouldn't be replate widout a
riferenct to that master of Saramonies Par Excellents Mister
Henry McAllister Jr.
To those of yez who hey seen the gintleman pladin at
the bar wid a sad and dignified look on his face as he tried to
enlighten the court; and to those of yez who hey seen him on
the Grand march from his office to the Dinver Club, gracefully swingin his cane and bowin here and there, wid discretion, to the better elemint,-it would hev bin a rivelation
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to see him thet nite presidin over the prize fite wid sang Froyd
and wise cracks that kept the bys in an uproar. Say do yez
know, whin the presint incumbrents is released, faith & Harry
wid his grace and illigance and brains would be a blessin
and inspiration to the Ligislative Halls at Washington.
I have jist ordered me Sunday School quarterly discontinued as Dicta now civers the feeld in much beter shape. I
am all rapped up in the controversy that is now ragin between
Mr. Grant and Mr. Stearns as to whither trial Jidges have
improved any since the time of Judge Pilot. Mr. Stearns says
yes. Mr. Grant says that while he and Mr. Stearns got their
articyls out of the same book he has come to the opposite conclusion.
When this matter has been finaly sittled I trust some one
will write an ellucidatin articyl explainin whether Cain killed
Abel wid a hatchet or chucked him out of an areplane.
I see where another Idle has got feet of clay. Our Destric Atturney has been wayed in the balance of Oh Justice and
been found wantin-to have a mind of his own. Sure and
this is a strangely unusuel sin for a public official and should
be appropriately punished. In fact can yez conceive of a
greater sin-unless it is the Mayor.
Throw on another lump buys and kape the home fires
burnin !
Well Mr. Iditor I have now dis-cussed most of the problems on me mind at this time so I will now close and pack my
grip for the State Bar Meetin at the Springs.
Yours truly,
G. Flannigan
P.S. Before I reely decide to go to the Springs could yez
tell me confidentially and as a matter of self protiction which
one and how many of the prisent or passed Congressmen from
Denver is going to spake, in which case do we git back Saturday or Sunday?

REVOCATION OF WILLS-HOW ACCOMPLISHED AND THE EFFECT
By J. Warner Mills, Jr., of the Denver Bar
An address delivered before the Law Club.
HE question of the drafting and probating of wills is a
branch of law of peculiar interest to all lawyers. There
are many lawyers who, during their practice of law,
may have no occasion to familiarize themselves with the law
pertaining to torts, negligence, public utilities, bankruptcy
and many other branches of specialized law. But I question
whether or not-there is any lawyer who actively engages in the
practice of law, who has not, sometime or other, been called
upon to prepare a will or present a will for probate.
As my space is limited, I will not be able to discuss the
making or drafting of a will. I will not determine whether
or not a blind man may legally execute a will; I will not
consider the propriety of any provisions in a will; neither
will I enter into a mathematical calculation as to the resulting increase in population which will be derived from
the provisions of the will of Charles Vance Miller, in
Toronto, who has just left $2,000,000 to the woman who gives
birth to the most children during a stated period which terminates in 1935.
For the purposes of this paper it will be assumed that a
person, sound in mind and memory, and over the age of 17
years, if personal property only is disposed of, and over the
age of 21 if real estate is devised, has executed a will in the
manner provided by statute. After this will has been properly
attested, declared and published the testator finds that one of
the objects of his bounty has died or else the testator has since
been married and naturally, therefore, determines to have a
new will drawn by his lawyer. You will note that the man
whom I have in mind is a wise and cautious man who will not
leave this important question even to the skilled experts of a
trust company. Among the first questions which he asks his
lawyer is: "How can I dispose of the will which is now in
existence. Of course, I do not want any contest to arise over
my estate by having two wills in existence".
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The lawyer appreciates the responsibility placed upon
him and so makes a careful study of the question involved. He
finds that there are two ways of revoking a will, namely,
A. Revocation by operation of law.
B. Revocation by intent of testator.
A.

Revocation by Operation of Law

Revocation by operation of law results when some change
of circumstances occurs which the statute states shall constitute a revocation or else some act or situation is construed
by the Courts to be a revocation irrespective of the intention
of the testator.
Section 2, Chapter 194, Session Laws 1923, provides:
Section 2. No will shall be revoked otherwise than by the subsequent
marriage of the testator, or by burning, tearing or obliterating the said will by
the testator himself, or in his presence, by his direction and consent, or by
some other will or codicil in writing, declaring the same, executed, declared
and attested as provided in Section 13 thereof, and no words spoken shall revoke or annul any will in writing executed, declared and attested as aforesaid.

1. The first method of revocation by operation of law,
as set forth in the statute, is the "subsequent marriage of the
testator". Marriage of course may revoke or provoke most
anything.
2. A will may be at least partially revoked or altered
by Section 5190, Compiled Laws, 1921, prescribing that a
beneficiary under a will is not qualified to act as a witness to
the will. If a beneficiary so acts the statute provides that the
legacy or interest of such beneficiary shall be null and void.
If the beneficiary is also an heir at law, then the legacy is
void only to the amount in excess of that which the beneficiary
would derive from the estate as an heir in the event that the
testator had died intestate.
3. Section 5189, Compiled Laws 1921, provides that
where a child is born after the execution of a will, and there
is no provision in the will for such child, and nothing to show
an intention of the testator to disinherit such child, then all
legacies and devisees shall be abated in equal proportions, to
raise a portion for such child equal to that which the child
would have received had the testator died intestate.
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4. A husband or widow may, as provided by Section
5185, C. L. 1921, elect to receive one-half of the estate as provided by statute, in lieu of taking under the terms of the will,
and to that extent a will may be considered revoked.
5. Session Laws, 1923, page 712, Section 1, provides
that any person convicted of murder in the first or second degree shall not take by devise, inheritance or otherwise, and
this also may operate to revoke a will.
6. In addition to the five methods of revocation by
operation of law as stated above, a will is construed by the
courts to be revoked or at least altered where the testator sells
or loses any property which was specifically willed to a legatee, without any provision for substitution; where a testator
mis-describes property owned by him; where a beneficiary
dies leaving no heirs at law; where the will violated the rule
in Shelley's case; where the provisions of a will are so indefinite and uncertain that they cannot be executed; where it
is found that the testator was insane or acting under undue
influence at the time the will was executed. There are also
other cases similar to these where the courts construe the will
revoked or altered.
B.

Revocation by Intent of Testator

This second general method of revoking a will includes
by far the most numerous and divergent means of revocation.
The statutory provisions of "burning, tearing or obliterating"
will be first considered together. This would also include, as
provided by statutes in many states, the words "canceling" and
"destroying".
The paramount question to consider in this matter is
"What was the intent of the testator". This intent of the
testator must be first of all manifest on the face of the instrument itself. Also the intent must be expressed by one capable
at that time of performing a legal act or as the cases say "An
act by one having capacity to make a will". For instance, the
act of an insane man cannot revoke a will. (In re Goldsticker,
192 N. Y. 35; 18 L. R. A. N. S. 99; 84 N. E. 581) nor the act
of one suffering from delirium tremens, nor the act of one
who is drunk.
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It is also true that even though a testator destroys a will,
still if he did not actually intend to do so, it does not necessarily operate to revoke the will. (in re Allens Will, 88 N. J.
Eq. 291, 102 Atl. 147). The difficulty in such cases grows
out of the inability to prove by whom, or under what circumstances the will was torn, destroyed or the like. If the will
was in the testator's custody and such acts were done before
his death there is a presumption that such acts were done lawfully, and that they were done by testator, or by someone in
his presence and with his authority. Another problem arises
when it is sought to probate such will. If the will has been
destroyed it cannot be presented to the court, and the court
is then governed by the statutory rules which govern the probating of a lost will.
No matter what may be the intention of the testator, if it
is not manifest on the face of the instrument it does not operate
as a revocation. Authority to another to burn, cancel or otherwise destroy a will does not amount to a revocation if the will
itself is not actually burned or destroyed in pursuance of such
authority. In such cases, we have the intent but not the act.
So, also, even if the authority to burn or destroy a will is in
writing, it is not a substitute for the doing of the act. (Harris
vs. McDonald, 152 Ga. 18; 108 S. E. 448.)
Now, considering our statute in detail, the first method
mentioned of revocation by intent of testator is that of burning.
1. Burning
Assuming that the question of intent is proven, the act
of burning must go so far that a portion of the paper upon
which the will is written is burned, so that such burning is
visible. It is not necessary that any part of the writing be
burned or rendered illegible. (White vs. Casten, 46 N. C.
197; 59 Am. Dec. 585). Where the envelope in which the
instrument is contained is burned but the will itself is untouched, this is not burning the will in compliance with the
statute. (In re Silva's Estate, 169 Cal. 116; 145 Pac. 1015).
2. Tearing
Tearing the paper or parchment on which the will is
written, with intention of revoking the will, constitutes a re-
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vocation. It has been held under a statute similar to ours
that tearing includes cutting. (Burton vs. Wylie, 261 Ill. 397;
103 N. E. 976). The degree of tearing or the portion of the
will torn is not the controlling feature of this method of revocation. A slight tearing, if done with the intention of revoking a will, is sufficient. The most frequent method used
is tearing off the signature of the testator or tearing off the
attestation clause. Even tearing off an unnecessary part of the
will, such as a seal where the will need not be under seal, may
also constitute a revocation. (White's- Will, 25, N. J. Eq.
501).
3. Obliterating
Obliterating is literally and technically a blotting out.
(Townsend vs. Howard, 86 Me. 285; 29 Atl. 1077). The
word "cancelling", though not used in our statute, is sometimes used in the same sense as obliterating. Thus drawing
lines across the will, or through the words thereof, is frequently spoken of as an obliteration as well as a cancellation.
Marking out the signature of the testator 'with a lead pencil,
wherever such signature appears, and drawing lines through
the principal gift, has been improperly spoken of as an obliteration, although the original words were legible. (Townsend vs. Howard, 86 Me. 285; 29 Atl. 1077).
In this connection, and with reference to tearing also, it
may be said that where the testator tears or obliterates one
word or one sentence with intent to alter or revoke the will
only so far as that one word or sentence is concerned, but not
intending to revoke the whole will, such act does not constitute
a revocation of the will. The Court will give effect to the
whole will as originally drawn if the clause stricken can be
satisfactorily proven; otherwise, that portion of the will
stricken is considered a part of the residuary estate. So also
the erasure of the name of one legatee or devisee and writing
in the name of another party will not be recognized by the
court. (Hartz vs. Sobel, 136 Ga. 565; 38 L. R. A., N. S. 797;
Ann. Cases, 1912 D. 165; 71 S. E. 995).
Revocation by Some Other Will or Codicil
The question of the revocation of a will by "some other
will or codicil in writing, declaring the same, executed, de4.
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clared and attested" etc. as provided by our statute, opens a
field for a great difference of opinion and one in which many
interesting questions may arise.
In discussing this question, it is well to first call to mind
the definition of a will. In the popular meaning of the term,
"a will is a disposition, made by a competent testator in the
form prescribed by law, of property over which he has legal
power of disposition, which disposition is of such nature as
to take effect at the death of the testator".
Under this definition more than one writing purporting
to be a will may be in existence at one and the same time. The
mere fact that a will is subsequently executed does not of itself
necessarily revoke the former will. Both wills may be presented for probate unless the latter will expressly revokes the
former or the terms are so in conflict with the former that the
court cannot give effect to the former will. This condition is
clearly set forth in the case of Whitney vs. Hannington, 36
Colo. 407. Judge Bailey, in discussing the question, said:
"The same principle applies with greater force where there are two
distinct instruments relating to the same subject matter. In such a case an
inconsistent devise or bequest in the second or last instrument is a complete
revocation of the former. But if part is inconsistent and part is consistent,
the first will is deemed to be revoked only to the extent of the discordant
dispositions, and so far as may be necessary to give effect to the one last made."

The moral to be derived from this case is to be sure that
a revocation clause is contained in every will.
It is proper to mention at this time, in connection with
the execution of codicils, the reason for the new act in regard
to wills found in 1923 Session Laws (Chapter 194). The
case of Twilley vs. Durkee, 72 Colo. 444, decided in January
1923, disclosed a state of facts where two wills were presented
for probate, the latter will expressly revoking the former. In
executing the latter will, the testatrix signed the will and then
two witnesses were brought in who signed as attesting witnesses but who did not actually see the testatrix sign her name.
The court, Judge Campbell delivering the opinion, held that
where a will contained a revoking clause it was necessary that
the will be signed in the presence of the witnesses, but this
was not necessary if the will contained no revoking clause.
The Court reviewed the cases in other states and particularly

DICTA

those from Illinois, from which our law was copied, and said:
"Revocation of a former will can be made only in the ways authorized
by our statutory law. When the method employed, which the statute authorizes, is by a subsequent will, a revocation to be effective must be expressly declared, and the later will, which destroys a former will, must be executed in
accordance with the statute relating to revocations of wills. Mrs. Durkee's
will, containing an express clause of revocation, was not executed in accordance with the provisions of our statute applicable to wills of this character,
was void and should not be admitted to probate".

Justices Teller, Denison and Burke dissented, holding
that the disposing clauses of the second will should be considered separate from the revocation clause, and even though
the revocation clause was not effective the disposing clauses
should be considered so, but they agreed, with the majority
opinion, that a testator must sign a revoking will or codicil in
the presence of the witnesses, but that such was not necessary
if the will contained no revoking clause.
With this case in mind our law was amended, practically
re-enacting our former statute relative to the revocation of
wills, but providing that a revoking will or codicil should be
executed as provided by the preceding section, that is the one
pertaining to wills only.
5.

-Effect of Revocation of a Subsequent Will

What is the effect of a testator destroying a subsequent
will or codicil? By so doing is the former will revived? Does
the testator die intestate? Or does the testator die intestate
only as to that particular property which is segregated by the
codicil?
Probably if this question were submitted to any one of
you, you would unhesitatingly say that any will which is
found at the death of the testator is valid and should be presented for probate.
In discussing this question, first consider the difference
in effect between a codicil to a will and a second or subsequent
will revoking all former wills.
The execution of a codicil is a re-affirmation or republication of the will. The codicil thereby becomes a part of the
will, as much so as any clause in the will itself. On the other
hand a revoking will takes effect upon the death of the testa-
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tor and supersedes and wipes out of existence all former wills.
In view of the small number of cases involving the effect
of the destruction of a codicil, the question will be considered
from the point of view of the destruction of a subsequent will.
The law would apply even more forcibly where a codicil only
is involved.
Before the Statute of Frauds there was no attempt at
statutory regulation of the revocation of a testament. The
Statute of Frauds provided that a written testament could not
be revoked by testator's oral declarations unless such revocation or will was reduced to writing, read to the testator and
allowed by him. Three witnesses were necessary to prove
such revocation.
The ecclesiastical courts adopted a rule to the effect that
no presumption, either for or against the revival of a will
would be indulged in by the revocation of the later testament.
These courts held that the question of revival was solely a
matter of intention of the testator to be shown by testimony,
either verbal or written.
The common law courts took the position that a will was
ambulatory and did not take effect until the death of the testator and that its operation as a revocation of a prior will was
likewise ambulatory and did not take effect until the death of
the testator.
The Statute of Victoria was then passed which provided
that "no will or codicil, or any part thereof, which shall be
in any manner revoked, shall be revived otherwise than by the
re-execution thereof".
These four different theories are set forth here to show
a reason or background for the great conflict of authorities in
the United States at this time.
The first case in the United States to consider this question was that of James vs. Marvin, 3 Conn. 577. The Court
found:
"An express revocation is a positive act of the party, which operates
by its own proper force, without being at all dependent on the consummation
of the will in which it is found and absolutely annuls all precedent devises."

The Court then proceeded to justify its position by reference to an English case which was actually decided under an
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ecclesiastical rule of law, that is that the intent of the testator
to die intestate was shown by evidence and the revoking of a
subsequent will did not thereby revive a former will.
The case of James vs. Marvin has been severely criticized
by several cases in other states. It is a case which was decided
upon an erroneous assumption of facts and really begs the
very question in issue.
Nevertheless, this case has been adopted by other courts
and is the basis for the law in the states of Michigan, Texas
and Georgia.
Incidentally, Connecticut has now abandoned this theory
and has adopted the common law rule. (Pecks Appeal, 50
Conn. 562).
In addition to the states mentioned, Mississippi and Wisconsin have adopted this rule, but do not base their decision
on the case of James vs. Marvin.
The Ecclesiastical Rule
The application of this rule of law operates less harshly
than any other and is in keeping with the actual intention of
the testator. Under this rule no presumption arises, either
for or against the validity of the first will, the question to be
settled and determined by evidence as to the intention of the
testator in destroying a subsequent will. This law, first pronounced by Massachusetts in the case of Pickens vs. Davis, 134
Mass. 252, has been looked upon with favor by several states.
Queen Victoria or Statutory Rule
The question in dispute has also been settled by some
states adopting statutes regulating the revocation of a will
and providing that any will or codicil revoked by a subsequent
will cannot be revived except by republication and re-execution. These statutes follow, to some extent, the act of Queen
Victoria. Typical of this is the state of New York, which
statute is:
"If, after the making of any will, the testator shall duly make and
execute a second will, the destruction, cancelling or revocation of such second
will shall not revive the first will, unless it appears by the terms of such revocation, that it was his intention to revive and give effect to his first will;
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or unless after such destruction, cancelling or revocation he shall republish
his first will"--Section 41, Decedent Estate Law.

You will note that this statute is a combination of the
Queen Victoria Statute and the ecclesiastical rule of law.
North Dakota, South Dakota, Ohio, California and
Indiana are among the states which have adopted statutes
upon this subject.
Under such a statute a peculiar situation may arise. The
Courts in New York have repeatedly held that where a codicil
is executed segregating certain property from the corpus of
the estate of the deceased, and such codicil is later destroyed,
then the deceased dies intestate as to that property which is
segregated by the codicil while the balance of the estate passes
under the terms of the will.
The Common Law Rule
By a process of elimination it may be said that the remaining states in the United States have adopted the common
law rule or else have not been called upon to pass on this question. In substance this rule is that a will is ambulatory and
does not take effect until the death of the testator and that a
revocation clause in any later or subsequent will must likewise
be ambulatory and does not take effect at all unless in existence
at the death of the testator. A majority of text writers consider this rule as the most logical.
The leading case of Stetson vs. Stetson, 200 Ill. 611, 66
N. E. 262, 61 L. R. A. 641, clearly sets forth the basis of the
law. After reviewing the cases, the Court concluded:
"If he destroyed the will with the intention of cancelling or revoking
it, it was cancelled or revoked as an entirety. So long as Jesse Stetson was
alive this second will was merely ambulatory and had no operation and could
have no operation until his death. While it was thus ambulatory and before
his death, the presumption is that he destroyed it, and, if he destroyed it, the
clause contained in it, which revoked all former wills, was cancelled and revoked, as well as the balance of the will. It necessarily results that the former
will of December 3, 1897, was revived when the subsequent will, containing
the revoking clause, was cancelled or destroyed."

Again, in the case of Bates vs. Hacking, 68 Atl. 622; 28
R. I. 523; 125 A. S. R. 759; 14 L. R. A., N. S. 937, the Court
declared:
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"The writing declaratory of an intention to revoke is evidence of a
present intention, and, when executed becomes of itself a complete revocation;
but the revocation by will takes effect only when the will of which it forms
a part becomes effective and that can never be in the lifetime of the testator.
"Here the intention of the testator is plain and dear. A will is
ambulatory till the death of the testator. If the testator lets it stand till he
dies, it is his will. If he does not suffer it to do so, it is not his will. Here
he had two. He has cancelled the second. It has no effect, no operation, it
is no will at all being cancelled by his death. But the former which was
never cancelled stands as his will."

In Marsh vs. Marsh, 3 Jones Law, 77; 64 Am. Dec. 598,
a North Carolina case, the Court said:
"As wills are ambulatory and have no operation until the death of the
testator, it is difficult to see how the execution of a second will, which is afterwards destroyed by the testator can in any wise affect the validity of a will
previously executed. Both are inactive during the life of the testator, and
the cancellation of the second, it would seem, must necessarily leave the first
to go into operation at the testator's death."

An examination of authorities shows that Colorado is
among those states which have never been called upon to pass
on the question at issue. We have no precedent in this state.
The cases of Twilley vs. Durkee, 72 Colo. 444, and Freeman
vs. Hart, 61 Colo. 456, discuss to a great extent the question of
revocation of wills and the effect upon former wills but are
determined under different facts.
It may also be said that Judge Rothgerber, during his
term of office as County Judge here in Denver, was never
called upon to decide this controversy. When this question
was presented to Judge Luxford, he adopted the common law
rule as stated in the case of Stetson vs. Stetson.
In conclusion, let me say that the common law rule, logical as it is in its reasoning, probably violates the actual intention of the testator in the greater number of cases, especially
where the later will contains an express revocation clause.
Most of the laity apparently believe that the express revocation clause revokes the first will at once; and the rule that the
revocation of the second will automatically leaves the first
will in effect, frequently results in giving effect to a testamentary disposition which the testator has long since forgotten and

DICTA

which, if he had remembered it, he would have thought had
no legal effect.
It is particularly unfortunate that there should be so
great a conflict of authority upon a question which may be of
such vital importance to the objects of the testator's bounty.
Personally, I believe that the fairest and most effective
method of settling this question is to enact a statute similar to
that adopted in New York.

(The following court order was submitted by Mr. Erl H. Ellis, who assures the
editor that the original, written in long hand, really is a work of art worthy of
photostatic reproduction.)

GARNISHEE ORDER TO TURN GOODS ATTACHED AND
LEVIED ON OVER TO CONSTABLE W. H. STRANEY,
TO BE IN HIS CUSTODY ACCORDING TO LAW.
The A. T. & S. F. Ry. Co. through its agent here, Mr. E.
Springstead here, refusing to act any longer as garnishee and
custodian of the goods billed by E. J. King to J. A. Wilsey,
Denver, Colorado, and all others by R. J. King in this case
and the said Mr. E. Springstead having been commanded
either to ship aforesaid goods to their destination or have
them removed from the company's premises, this Court hereby orders the A. T. & S. F. Ry. Co. Mr. E. Springstead, Agt.,
to turn said goods over to W. H. Straney, Constable, for him
to take care of them according to law.
Witness my hand and seal this 13th day of August 1929.
F. E. SCHMIDT,
Justice of the Peace. (SEAL)

ELEVEN POINTS OF LAW FOR THE
LAYMAN (AND THE LAWYER)

W

By Edward V. Dunklee, of the Denver Bar
HY should an article entitled "Law for the Layman"
have a place in a Legal Magazine? Probably because
it is almost a truism that professional men are poor
business men, as far as their personal affairs are concerned.
At any rate the test of this reasoning is whether or not, as this
article is perused, the reader recalls any time when he has
violated any of the fundamentals of the law herein referred
to, which he undoubtedly understands thoroughly enough to
advise his clients, but not sufficiently to follow himself.
The saying "Physician heal thyself" applies to the lawyer
who refuses to take his own advice. The bovine intelligence
shown by our able lawyers who have during their lifetimes
headed their profession and yet died poor, or with their affairs hopelessly involved, illustrates what we mean.
As to the reason we have chosen eleven points, we are
frank to say that we have none, except that history gives a
large place to documents that are divided into points.
To the layman we wish to say that there is truth in the
old statement, "That the man who is his own lawyer has a fool
for a client", and the first suggestion for antidotes in the popular Pocket Diary-that a physician be called--so our advice
is that a lawyer be consulted first.
The eleven points, then, for our consideration here, are:
1. Execute a proper Will.
2. Beware of partnerships.
3. Sign no man's bond.
4. Have the title to property examined before purchase.
5. Do not loan money without security.
6. Read before you sign.
7. Checking accounts.
8. Have all contracts in writing.
9. Keep valuable papers in safe or vault.
10. Be careful what you write.
11. Do not live on credit.

DICTA

And for those who desire an even dozen we might. add
the now popular suggestion that "Crime never pays".
I.
Will
Nearly every one believes that he will sometime make
his will, but the majority postpone this duty until it is too late.
It is as important to have your will properly executed and
witnessed in accordance with the laws of your State as it is to
leave life insurance for the protection of your family. The
laws of the states differ as to number of witnesses required and
as to the technical execution of a will in order for it to be
valid. If you are a layman, consult your personal lawyer and
not a bank as to the details of your will and the appointment
of an executor who is personally interested in your affairs and
will see that your wishes are carried out. If you are a lawyer,
make your own.
II.
Partnerships
Business partnerships are even more dangerous than marriage contracts, unless, of course, you are trying out the modern companionate marriage, and we therefore advise to beware of partnerships. A partnership involves personal liability, and, as in the case of marriage, you never know your
partner until you have accepted him, and then it is often too
late. A written contract should be drawn up in the case of
every partnership, showing the exact assets and liabilities of
the partnership, the obligations to be undertaken by the business, and a statement as to the division of profits and losses
and the expenses allowed to be contracted by each partner.
A partnership with only a general understanding is almost
sure to fail and the partners become involved with their creditors and with each other. Remember, like marriage, it is for
better or worse, and too often for worse.
III.
Sign No Man's Bond
We believe that Mr. Solomon, of Bible fame, advised his
followers some time ago not to sign a bond-and we submit
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that the rule holds good today. Of course where a relative
is in difficulty it is sometimes necessary, but this does not come
under the head of business sense and cannot be so included.
The indiscriminate signing of bonds is a most dangerous practice and is bound to lead the signer into great difficulties.

IV.
Examination of Abstract
It is only common sense, to insure against mistakes in the
title of the property you are about to purchase, to have an
examination made by an attorney. The expense of such an
examination is nominal and can only be regarded as sensible
insurance against later pitfalls. Almost always there is a considerable amount involved in the transfer of property, and for
the layman to attempt to pass upon any title is absolute folly.
We believe it is not too broad a statement to say that this is
one rule to which there are no exceptions.
V.
Loaning Money Without Security
"I had money and a friend. I loaned my money to my
friend, and now I have neither my money nor my friend."
This about tells the story. If you desire to help your friend
give him the amount he needs - because it will probably
amount to a gift anyway--and you will not thereby lose your
friend, if you value his friendship. If you loan to him in a
larger amount than he can pay back he becomes embarrassed
over the fact that he cannot pay and you will soon lose his
friendship as well as your money. This policy does not lead
to parsimony, but on the other hand is good business judgment, and if followed you will have a fund on hand to help
the needy friend by way of gift, where necessary.
VI.
Read Before You Sign
This injunction saves more trouble and is more far-reaching than would appear at first glance, as the courts are full of
cases where people have failed to read the contracts signed by
them. There is usually in a mortgage or promissory note a
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considerable amount of small printed matter which often allows judgment to be taken under certain circumstances, and
this should be understood by the 'signer. Remember the
smaller the print, the greater the risk. Read the obligation
you sign, or have it read to you, and ask your attorney to explain the part you do not understand. There are many cases
on record where people have signed warranty deeds to their
homes not understanding at all what they have signed or even
inquiring as to the contents of the document.
VII.
Checking Account
We have no bank stock but advise a checking account for
the receipts furnished by the checks. Hardly a month passes
in the office but what the question arises as to whether or not
a bill has been paid, and the best evidence is a signed and cancelled check. A checking account leads to careful business
methods and prompt payment of bills, and discourages the
carrying of large sums of loose money, or having it around
the home. Keep your checks as receipts until the statute of
limitations has expired in your State, if the account settled is
in question, or for a period of one year for the average account.
VIII.
Contracts In Writing
About one-third of the lawsuits would be saved if people
insisted on contracts in writing containing the details of proposed work or improvement. It is very easy to indulge in
generalities, and then be disappointed in the work done. Ask
for several bids on the work you propose to have done, and
ask that these bids contain the specifications. Accept the one
that meets your needs and your troubles are at an end, for
you then will know just what to expect and what you will have
to pay---otherwise you will probably be disappointed in both
what you get and in what you pay, and often times settle the
matter in court. Be sure and have all of the details of the
agreement in the contract, as the written contract controls,
and not the prior conversation.
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Ix.
Valuable Papers
A strong box with a key, in the home, is better than nothing for your valuable papers, but a safe or deposit box is far
better, as many valuable deeds have been mislaid. It is well
to place as many deeds as you can on record, as this protects
your title for all time to come, whether you lose the originals
or not; but in some instances valuable papers cannot be recorded, and in that case they must be retained in a safe place.
Care in keeping your papers often protects your estate as well.
In short, use the banks for your valuables, and your lawyer
as your legal adviser.
X.
Writing
Solomon, again, warned us some time ago as to the danger
of hasty or impulsive writing, and it was probably true then,
as it is now, that you will not receive that intense enjoyment
in seeing your letters in print in the public press, with glaring
red head-lines, that you did at the time when you were so
freely expressing your thoughts. If you doubt this pick up
the evening paper and put yourself in the position of some of
the effusive and love-sick writers of the missives set forth in
full and in great detail on the front page. Most of those letters would never have been sent if the writer had waited over
night to mail them in the morning. Many a man has suffered
a sudden distribution of his wealth on account of his letters
that were kept until they made valuable and interesting reading for the general public. Do right and fear no man; do
not write, and fear no woman.
XI.
Do Not Live On Credit
Benjamin Franklin, in Poor Richard's Almanac, adjured
his readers to live within their means, and that a "penny saved
is a penny earned". The truths expounded by Poor Richard
are more true today than ever before, with almost every other
caller presenting a glittering plan whereby you may purchase
some luxury, which you cannot afford, upon the installment
plan. One of the greatest evils of our modern civilization is

DICTA

this installment buying, because, on the one hand, it forces the
seller to charge a higher price to take care of his losses, and
on the other hand, the purchaser to pay a higher price on account of the time that he asks. Hardly anything is owned
outright in this day and age, and it is only a question of the
equity held by the purchaser, and just at what date it will pay
him most to turn the article back. A recent vaudeville joke
illustrates my point: An aristocrat was showing a tramp
about his home, and pointing to an elegant set of furniture
said: "That set goes back to Louis the XVth, my friend".
The tramp answered: "That's nothing, I have a set in my
home that goes back to Sears-Roebuck the 14th."
It is especially important for the young layman or lawyer
to budget his expenses and to keep strict account as to what
he is doing, so that he can tell from year to year what advance
he is making in his profession and financially. In fact, this
is one sort of advice that it is easy to give others, and so hard
to take ourselves.
Crime Never Pays
Under this heading we might conclude that if the foregoing eleven points were lived up to by the reader the admonition, "Crime never pays" would not be needed. At any
rate, in these days when we are studying ways and means for
the prevention of crime, the above points might not be amiss
towards helping to this end.

NOTICE
The new telephone number of Mr. Albert Gould,
Secretary of the Denver Bar Association, is Tabor 6072.

DRED SCOTT AND JOHN ELK

LAWYERS

By J. W. Kelley, of the Denver Bar
who select for light reading the opinions of
the United States Supreme Court will find two curious
cases which, while almost identical in the legal questions involved, were strangely dissimilar in their historical
effect upon the public mind.
The first is Dred Scott vs. Sanford, 19 Howard 393. Dred
Scott sued in the Federal Court, and to do so it was necessary
that he be a citizen of the State in which he sued. A plea to
his declaration set up the fact that Dred Scott was a negro of
African descent whose ancestors were slaves of pure African
blood. Dred Scott demurred to this exemplification of his
pedigree and a majority of the Supreme Court of the United
States, on appeal, said, "a free negro of the African race,
whose ancestors were brought to this country and sold as
slaves, is not a 'citizen' within the meaning of the constitution."
The opinions, pro and con, occupied 240 printed pages, but
that was the rule given.
Four years of civil war followed, precipitated, some
claim, by this decision. Then came the Fourteenth Amendment providing that "all persons born or naturalized in the
United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside."
This amendment was supposed to have set aside the rule
of the Dred Scott case. Not so, however.
In Omaha, Nebraska, in 1880, an Indian named John
Elk, who had been separated from his tribe for several years
and was engaged in the then necessary occupation of driving
a hack on the streets of the Nebraska metropolis, applied to
one Charles Wilkins, an election official of the Fifth Ward, to
be registered as a voter at the coming election. Wilkins refused to register him, and Elk sued for $6,000.00 damages in
the United States Circuit Court of the District of Nebraska,
alleging his citizenship of that State and the further fact that
he was an Indian, born here, and his consequent right to vote.
The Elk case then followed the path beaten by Dred
Scott in 1854. Wilkins filed a general demurrer and the Circuit Court sustained it. When the case reached the Supreme
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Court of the United States, Judge Gray wrote the opinion and
followed the rule announced in the Dred Scott case. His opinion contained all the copious learning on the subject that could
be derived from the Dred Scott case with such variations as
were necessary in a case when an Indian instead of a Negro
claimed to be an American citizen by means apparently not
provided for by the Constitution. Elk vs. Wilkins, 112 U. S.
94.
Justices Harlan and Woods dissented and their opinion is
as rich with reason and authority as were the dissenting opinions in the Dred Scott case. It is plain, from reading these
opinions, that the language of the Constitution is not always
and everywhere exactly clear and plain, even where clarified
by amendments.
But no dreadful consequences followed the refusal to
allow John Elk the right to sue in a Federal Court. No armies
with banners assembled to vindicate the rights of the humble
Jehu of pure Indian descent. Congress merely passed an act
providing that Indians, voluntarily separated from their tribes
for more than one year, became ipso facto citizens of the
United States and thereby the descending lines of Eiks were
merged with the Scotts to mingle with what has sometimes
been referred to as the heterogeneous mass of our citizenry.
Lawyers, judges or law-makers, who have in mind employing the apparently all embracing words "citizen" or "all
persons" are respectfully referred to the two cases cited herein
for guidance. The words, apparently, do not comprehend as
much as might be supposed.
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will be printed only after the petition has been disposed of.)

APPPEAL AND

ERROR-WRIT OF ERROR-DISMISSAL-NO.

12,341-Ernst versus Eldred, Judge-Decided May 27,
1929.
Facts.-Judgment in lower court was rendered on July
8, 1927. The writ of error was brought on March 30, 1929.
Eldred filed motion that the writ of error be dismissed on the
ground that it was not brought within one year from the rendition of the judgment.
Held.-Rule Eighteen provides that a Writ of Error
shall not be brought after the expiration of one year from the
rendition of the judgment complained of. The motion to
dismiss is well taken and will be granted.
Writ Dismissed.
PROMISSORY

NOTE-COGNOvIT-No.

12348-Sullivan vs.

International Harvester.-DecidedJune 17, 1929.
Facts.-On September 16, 1927, judgment was entered in
favor of the plaintiff on the complaint on a cognovit note. A
verified answer and confession of judgment was filed by an
attorney acting under the power contained in the note. Defendant knew about the judgment the next day after it was
rendered.
September 23, 1927, defendant appeared by
another attorney and moved to set the judgment aside, but
tendered no answer. He attempted to support the motion by
an affidavit. On November 21, 1927, he filed a further affidavit but still tendered no answer. On March 26th he filed
an answer, and on April 2nd plaintiff moved to strike the
same on the ground that it was not filed in apt time. The
motion was granted. The defendant then waited a year lacking ten days and brought the case to this court.
Held.-The judgment was regular and the answer should
have been stricken because not filed in apt time.
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INSURANCE-CANCELLATION OF POLICY-NO. 12353.-West-

chester Fire Insurance Company vs. Schuricht.-Decided
July 1, 1929.
Facts.-The Insurance Company insured the plaintiff
against loss or damage by hail to his growing crops. Later
the plaintiff suffered a loss, which loss was adjusted and paid.
Still later the plaintiff again suffered a loss, which the defendant refuses to pay. Trial was to the Court and Jury,
which found for the plaintiff. The only issue was whether the
policy was in force at the time of the second loss. The def endant offered a proof of loss and an adjustment blank in which
was the following clause "In consideration of this company
paying me $650 I hereby cancel my policy No. 9133", which
was signed by the plaintiff. The policy was not in possession
of the defendant and was never surrendered.
Held.-The question of whether or not the policy was

cancelled was submitted to the Jury and was a disputed fact.
The Jury found that it was not cancelled, and accordingly
returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. This Court will
not interfere with the finding of the jury.
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